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6
FOOTBALL MEMORABILIA,
TATTOOS, AND THE FALL OF
JIM TRESSEL AT OHIO STATE
Jamel K. Donnor and Collin D. Williams Jr.

Colloquially referred to as the “senator” because of his calculated responses to the
media and trademark sweater vests, Jim Tressel, the former head football coach for
The Ohio State University (OSU), tendered his resignation on May 30, 2011,
citing that the “recent situation has been a distraction for our great university”
(Tressel, 2011, p. 1). The “recent situation” Tressel was referring to was a story
posted on Yahoo!Sports, an online sports newspaper, which stated that for
approximately eight months he (Tressel) had failed to inform the university’s athletics
compliance department that ﬁve members of the football team, including starting
quarterback Terrelle Pryor, had sold or exchanged OSU sports memorabilia for
tattoos to Mr. Edward Rife, the owner of Fine Line Ink Tattoo, a tattoo parlor in
Columbus, Ohio. A violation of the NCAA’s amateurism policy regarding extra
beneﬁts and preferential treatment, Tressel – the most successful coach at Ohio
State since Woody Hayes – knew that reporting the student-athletes’ infractions
would result in their immediate disqualiﬁcation, and for all intents and purposes
preclude the team from contending in a Bowl Championship Series (BCS) postseason
bowl game.
Perhaps what was most troubling about the situation was Tressel’s behavior
upon learning of the violations and his actions once the matter became public. For
example, upon initial notiﬁcation of the student-athletes’ infractions by Christopher
Cicero, a local attorney and former football player at Ohio State, Tressel stated to
Cicero by email that he would “investigate the matter and take appropriate action”
(Robinson & Wetzel, 2011, p. 2). While there is very little information to determine
whether Tressel conducted an investigation as stated, it was clear, according to
Tressel’s Ohio State email account, that he chose to handle the matter personally
rather than notify the university’s compliance department, athletic director (Gene
Smith), or president (E. Gordon Gee), as stipulated in his employment contract.
Similarly, once the university began an internal investigation into the situation,
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Tressel falsely attested that he had reported any knowledge of NCAA violations to
the university.
Tressel’s conduct is symptomatic of the commercial forces and competitive pressures
to win in major college football (Oriard, 2009; Clotfelter, 2011). For example, despite
being a nonproﬁt organization, the NCAA (2010) reported that its total revenue
generated from big-time college football alone was $14,841,000; a $5,632,000
increase from $9,209,000 reported in 2004 (NCAA, 2010, p. 27). Similarly, universities with high-proﬁle teams, such as Ohio State, generate millions of dollars in
revenue through ticket and merchandise sales, corporate sponsors, and television
contracts. Likewise, the compensation packages for head (and assistant coaches) at many
of the top football programs currently exceed $1 million (Upton, Gillum, & Berkowitz,
2010). Consider, for example, that Tressel’s contract at the time of his resignation was
worth approximately $17.4 million over seven years. In addition to a base salary of
$550,000, a “longevity bonus” of $450,000, and the use of a private jet for
recruiting visits, Tressel’s contract stipulated that he receive a $25,000 raise per year,
and an annual contribution of $40,000 toward his retirement from the university
(Upton et al., 2010). In essence, the money in major college football is exorbitant.
The goal of this chapter is threefold. The ﬁrst is to describe the situation that
involved Tressel and OSU’s football program in-depth. The second goal is to
situate the Tressel scandal (and major college football) within a larger sociocultural
and political economic context. Speciﬁcally, by explaining what the former head
coach’s and the student-athletes’ actions convey regarding the commercialization of
intercollegiate football, power, and wrongful beneﬁce. The ﬁnal goal is to provide
an alternative ending to the OSU scandal – a counter-narrative, if you will. In
particular, we consider whether Tressel would have had to resign if his studentathletes had been paid to play.

The Case
On April 2, 2010, former Ohio State head football coach Jim Tressel received the
ﬁrst of a string of emails from Christopher Cicero, a local attorney, indicating that
several members of the OSU football team had received preferential treatment at a
Columbus tattoo parlor as a result of selling their athletics trophies, awards, apparel,
and equipment to Mr. Edward Rife, the owner of the parlor, who was also a
convicted felon. According to Cicero’s email, the U.S. Department of Justice
(DOJ) raided Rife’s home related to drug traﬃcking. In addition, Cicero indicated
to Tressel that the student-athletes should “stay away from this guy [Rife] . . . quite
frankly for their safety” (NCAA, 2011a, pp. 6–7). In response, Tressel thanked
Cicero and remarked that he would “get on it ASAP” (NCAA, 2011a, p. 7).
According to the NCAA’s (2011a) infractions report, rather than notify campus
oﬃcials of Cicero’s email, Tressel forwarded the email to Terrelle Pryor’s mentor
in Jeannette, Pennsylvania, to apprise him of the “situation.”
In a subsequent email sent on April 16, 2010, Cicero informed Tressel that Rife
conﬁrmed his interactions with some of the current members of the football team,
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and Cicero asked that the email “be treated as conﬁdential” (NCAA, 2011a, p. 7). In
addition to thanking Cicero, Tressel said, “Keep me posted as to what I need to do
if anything. I will keep pounding these kids hoping they grow up” (NCAA, 2011a,
p. 7). The next correspondence between Tressel and Cicero occurred on April 19,
2010, when Tressel sent an email to Cicero stating that “I told [the student-athletes]
to steer clear . . . is there any way I can get all the ring names. . . . . I have a little
plan once this year’s rings arrive” (NCAA, 2011a, p. 8). The “ring names” Tressel
was referring to were the names of the student-athletes other than Terrelle Pryor and
DeVier Posey who had sold their Big Ten Conference championship rings to Rife.
The next day (April 20, 2010), Cicero replied to Tressel that he would contact the
Columbus district attorney to inquire about the names of additional student-athletes
who might have sold their conference rings to Rife (NCAA, 2011a). For nearly
three weeks, Tressel did not notify university oﬃcials of the infractions or forward
Cicero’s emails to any university oﬃcials. In fact, the next correspondence between
Tressel and Cicero did not occur until June 10, 2010, when Tressel sent an email
inquiring about the additional ring names to which Cicero replied “no more names”
(NCAA, 2011a, p. 8). For more than two months, Tressel failed to inform the
university’s compliance department, athletic director, or president of the violations.
Incidentally, Tressel and Cicero did not have additional communication until
December 2010 – the same time at which OSU’s Oﬃce of Legal Aﬀairs received a
letter from the DOJ informing Ohio State of the DOJ’s criminal investigation of
Rife, during which DOJ oﬃcials seized “a signiﬁcant amount of OSU sports memorabilia” (U.S. Department of Justice [U.S. DOJ], 2010, p. 1). According to the U.S.
Department of Justice (2010), while “many of the items seized were acquired from
Ebay and autographed at various signing events . . . several of the items seized appear
to have belonged to Ohio State football players and/or The Ohio State University at
some point in time” (p.1). Among the items seized were several Big Ten Conference
Championship rings, trophies, and Ohio State football uniforms (U.S. DOJ, 2010).
In response, Ohio State conducted an investigation of the violations, during which
the student-athletes named in the DOJ’s letter admitted to wrongdoing. From this
investigation, the university uncovered additional violations (NCAA, 2011a, p. 4).
Among the additional violations uncovered from the internal institutional
investigation were “payment to several student-athletes for work not performed at
a private company, improper sale or exchange of institutional equipment or apparel
for cash, or reduced-cost/free tattoos from Mr. Rife’s tattoo parlor” (Ohio State
Athletics, 2012, p. 1). According to the infractions report, between spring 2009 and
summer 2011, Rife, without the university’s knowledge or approval, arranged for
the ﬁve football student-athletes to receive compensation for “work not performed”
(Ohio State Athletics, 2012, p. 1).

Sociocultural Context
A major policy dilemma surrounding the Tressel scandal is the NCAA’s amateurism
policy, which, among other things, prohibits student-athletes from receiving
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compensation for their involvement in college athletics. According to the NCAA
(2010), “student-athlete participation in intercollegiate athletics is an avocation”
(NCAA Bylaw, Article 2.9). What this means is that a student who participates in
NCAA-sanctioned athletic activities does so solely for its intrinsic value and functional purpose, such as learning the value of hard work and working within a team
setting. Indeed, the sheer volume of “pay-for-play” infractions involving former elite
student-athletes and institutions, such as Reggie Bush, Cam Newton, and the
University of Miami, suggests that college athletes should be allowed to proﬁt from
their labors. Further, not only have critics of major college sports considered these
bylaws unnecessary and exploitive (Glicksman, 2012; Wilbon, 2011; Sack, 2009),
some have even likened them to apartheid (McCormick & McCormick, 2010) and
slavery (Rhoden, 2007). Though he cautions against slavery comparisons, leading
civil rights historian Taylor Branch (2011) argues that the current college sports
regime is more analogous to colonialism as “two of the noble principles on which
the NCAA justiﬁes its existence – ‘amateurism’ and the ‘student-athlete’ – are
cynical hoaxes, legalistic confections propagated by the universities so they can
exploit the skills and fame of young athletes” (Branch, 2011, p. 3). In The Shame of
College Sports (2011), Branch states that “the real scandal is not that students are
getting illegally paid or recruited” (p. 3). This section provides further insight into
the controversy surrounding amateurism, more closely examining the rules, the
context in which they were created, the racial dynamics in college football and
basketball, and the extent to which various stakeholders proﬁt from intercollegiate
athletics.

The Rules
Article 2 of the NCAA manual for Division 1 athletics lists 16 Principles for
Conduct of Intercollegiate Athletics. The Principle of Amateurism, or Bylaw
Article 2.9, states:
Student-athletes shall be amateurs in an intercollegiate sport, and their
participation should be motivated primarily by education and by the physical,
mental and social beneﬁts to be derived. Student participation in intercollegiate athletics is an avocation, and student-athletes should be protected
from exploitation by professional and commercial enterprises.
(NCAA,2011b, p. 4)
Thus, the NCAA forbids students-athletes from receiving compensation for
participation in college athletics beyond the cost of attending college. Under Article
15, the NCAA requires that an institution “shall not award ﬁnancial aid to a student-athlete that exceeds the cost of attendance that normally is incurred by students
enrolled in a comparable program at the institution” (NCAA, 2011b, p. 192) and
“is an amount calculated by an institutional ﬁnancial aid oﬃce” (NCAA, 2011b,
p. 192). The bylaw violated by the OSU football players was 15.01.3: “Any student
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who receives ﬁnancial aid other than that administered by the student-athlete’s
institution shall not be eligible for intercollegiate athletics competition” (NCAA,
2011b, p. 191). By receiving money and tattoos in exchange for autographs, jerseys, and other athletic memorabilia, the OSU football players terminated their
amateur status as student-athletes and became ineligible to compete.

So-Called Student-Athletes
The term “student-athlete” endorses the wholesome virtue of amateurism in college
sports as well as the idealistic notion of academics over athletics. In reality, though,
the phrase was created to protect the NCAA from adequately compensating its
athletes by focusing on their status as students and preventing them from being
identiﬁed as employees. When Ray Dennison died of a head injury in Colorado in
the 1950s while playing football in Colorado for the Fort Lewis A&M Aggies, his wife
ﬁled for workers’-compensation death beneﬁts. According to the then-president of
the NCAA, Walter Byers, “the threat was the dreaded notion that athletes could
be identiﬁed as employees by state industrial commissions and the courts” (Byers
and Hammer, 1997, p. 69). Thus, in a rapid, yet calculated, response, the NCAA
“crafted the term student-athlete, and soon it was embedded in all NCAA rules
and interpretations as a mandated substitute for words as players and athletes” (Byers
and Hammer, 1997, p. 69). In conjunction with the amateurism rules, the term
student-athlete preserves the image of college athletes as being students ﬁrst, athletes
second, but never employees. Since its creation, the NCAA and its member institutions have won several liability cases, successfully circumventing potentially large
payouts. Evidently, the ambiguous term has been an exclusive shield for the
NCAA, both promoting the falsiﬁed noble ideals of amateurism and serving as an
eﬀective legal defense (Branch, 2011). In State Compensation Insurance Fund v.
Industrial Commission (1957), the Colorado Supreme Court ruled that neither
Dennison nor his wife was eligible for beneﬁts since the college was “not in the
football business.”

Proﬁts
It is no longer feasible to deny that college sports has evolved into big business
(Berkowitz & Upton, 2011a, 2011b; Greenberg & Smith, 2007; Upton, Gillum, &
Berkowitz, 2010; Wilson, Schrager, Burke, Hawkins & Gauntt, 2011). The
growing popularity of the major revenue-generating sports of basketball and football
has been evidenced by enormous price tags on television rights packages, athletic
department spending, and coaching salaries. In 2008, ESPN contracted to pay the
NCAA $500 million to broadcast four of the ﬁve major BCS games (Wilbon,
2011). Just the appearance of a team in a single BCS football game earned its
respective conference $18 million as well as an extra $4.5 million for each team
beyond the ﬁrst (Bakalar, 2009). By 2011, four individual conferences – the Big 12,
Pac 12, SEC, and ACC – had all signed football TV deals valued at more than a
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billion dollars each (Thamel, 2011). In 2010, the NCAA entered into a 14-year,
$10.8 billion dollar agreement with Turner/CBS sports to broadcast the Division I
Men’s Basketball Championship (Sandomir & Thamel, 2010). In a study of athletic
departments’ total expenditures, Berkowitz and Upton (2011b) found that 228
athletic departments had spent a total of $6.8 billion in 2010. In the same year, the
University of Alabama Athletics Department alone brought in $26.6 million in
revenue.
Coaches, too, have seen much of this proﬁt. Other high-proﬁle basketball and
football coaches such as Rick Pitino, Nick Saban, and John Calipari eclipse even
the $3.5 million that Tressel made in 2011 – in the same year, each brought in
$7.5, $5.9, and $3.8 million, respectively (Berkowitz & Upton, 2011a; Wilbon,
2011). In 2011, the coaches of approximately half of the 68 teams that made it to
the 2011 NCAA Men’s Basketball Tournament and 58 of the 120 FBS football
schools earned salaries greater than $1 million dollars (O’Neil, 2011). In contrast,
players see menial amounts of this revenue. In fact, a joint study conducted by the
National College Players Association (NCPA) and the Drexel University Department
of Sport Management found that the average student-athlete at an FBS school on full
scholarship has total earnings below the federal poverty line (Huma & Staurowsky,
2011). The comparisons to apartheid, colonialism, and slavery become clearer by
understanding the racial disparities between teams and coaches.

Race
When intercollegiate athletics were racially segregated and minority students were
barred from participation, college teams, regardless of the sport, were exclusively
White. Since their integration, though, the racial composition of college basketball
and football teams has grown to become overwhelmingly Black, while the racial
composition of the managers of the sports (coaches, athletic directors, university
oﬃcials, NCAA or conference oﬃcials, and so on) has remained overwhelmingly
White (McCormick & McCormick, 2010, 2012). In 2010, for example, the top 25
basketball and football teams were 66 and 61 percent Black, respectively, while the
administrators for those same teams were 91 and 96 percent White, respectively
(McCormick & McCormick, 2012). While it is blatant that Black men are the
majority in these sports and that their talent and labor have generated income for
their schools, the revenue has been disproportionately distributed. What is interesting, though, is that the amateurism laws that the NCAA put in place apply
solely to the athletes. As McCormick and McCormick (2012) explain, “amateurism
reserves the vast ﬁnancial rewards for the managers of college sports who are almost
exclusively of European descent” (p. 18).

Alternate Ending
In late 2011, after being rocked by a bevy of scandals, the NCAA convened with
conference representatives, member institution oﬃcials, and a variety of sports
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personalities who had demonstrated an acute interest in the compensation of
college athletes to amend their amateurism rules. By the close of the weekend-long
conference, the NCAA had agreed, in principle, “to amend Article 12 on amateurism,
Article 15 on ﬁnancial aid, and Article 16 on awards, beneﬁts, and expenses” and
“allow student-athletes the opportunity to open additional streams of income by
signing endorsement agreements and selling items associated with their athletic
achievements without losing their eligibility to compete” (Glicksman, 2012, p. 7).
Long-time proponents of the free-market view of college sports, ESPN columnist
and tenured sports journalist Michael Wilbon, and Allen Sack, a professor at the
College of Business at the University of New Haven and member of the 1966
University of Notre Dame national championship football team, were voted the
most valuable players (MVPs) for presenting compelling arguments in favor of
paying student-athletes. The passage below summarizes the free-market view as
explained by Sack (2009):
No good reason exists for preventing athletes from engaging in the same
entrepreneurial activities as their celebrity coaches. Big-time college athletes
should be able to endorse products, get paid for speaking engagements and be
compensated for the use of their likenesses on licensed products. They should
be allowed to negotiate an actual contract with the N.B.A. as part of a ﬁnal
project in a ﬁnance class, and have an agent. These athletes are working their
way through college by playing professional college sports. It is time to accept
this reality and move on.
In addressing the audience, Wilbon (2011) confessed, “he used to argue vehemently
against paying college athletes,” believing “tuition, room, board and books were
compensation enough.” However, after the NCAA began receiving “$11 billion
dollars for three weekends of television per year,” he admittedly became interested
not in “distributing the funds equitably or even paying every college athlete,” but
rather “in seeing the people who produce the revenue share a teeny, tiny slice of
it.” His stance is based in capitalism where “not everything is equal” or “fair.” For
example, “the most distinguished professor at the University of Alabama won’t
make $5.9 million in his entire tenure in Tuscaloosa,” but “Nick Saban will make
that this year.” Accordingly, he supports a system where “the football and men’s
basketball players get paid,” while “lacrosse, ﬁeld hockey, softball, baseball, soccer
players get nothing.” In fact, a particularly convincing aspect of Wilbon’s argument
is his rebuttal for those who were not in favor of paying athletes because of the
inability to do so “fairly”:
Using the inability to distribute the funds equally as an impediment is an
excuse, a rather intellectually lazy one at that. Nothing about the way
hundreds of millions of dollars is distributed is equitable or even fair. . . . . Of
the $174 million distributed from ﬁve bowl games, 83.4 percent went to six
conferences in 2011. . . . . So, the equitable-application excuse for not paying
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athletes doesn’t hold water; at the very least there’s a level of hypocrisy here
that ought to make the opponents of paying athletes uncomfortable.
(Wilbon, 2011)
To further illustrate his point, not only does Wilbon refute the claims of unfairness,
but he also continues on to reframe the University of Georgia “scandal” in which
the wide receiver on the football team sold his jersey for $1,000:
If somebody is willing to give A. J. Green $750 or $1,000 or even $2,500 for
his Georgia Bulldogs jersey, ﬁne, good. If one of his teammates, a tackle, can
fetch only $50 for his jersey, then it’ll be a good marketing lesson for both of
them. It’s called supply and demand, and if both men are fortunate enough to
reach the NFL it’ll be a lesson worth learning because that dynamic will exist
their entire careers. If a soccer player can’t get a dime for his jersey, well,
there’s a realization in that, too.
(Wilbon, 2011)
Here, Wilbon (2011), like Sack, alludes to the added value of engaging in a free
market for student-athletes beyond their getting paid to play. As Ben Glicksman
(2012) posits in Game Change: Letting Student-Athletes Earn a Living, allowing studentathletes to endorse products and use their fame to earn money would “teach them
valuable lessons about economics” and “help keep players in school,” by encouraging
“more students to complete their degrees instead of leaving early to play
professionally.” Thus, he concludes, “if the NCAA truly puts the student ﬁrst in
student-athlete, then a change must be made to help keep players in school”
(Glicksman, 2012, p. 13). Unfortunately, no such change was made.
The end of the OSU scandal makes an interesting case for why things remain as
is. Though the NCAA alleges that the ﬁve OSU football players who violated the
amateurism rules were allowed to postpone their suspension and play in the Sugar
Bowl because they “did not receive adequate rules education during the time
period the violations occurred” (NCAA, 2010), few believe these claims. Take, for
instance, the response of Bob Hunter, a writer for the Columbus Dispatch:
No columnist or commentator I’ve found can see the logic in the NCAA
ruling permitting the Ohio State players to play in New Orleans and then sit
out ﬁve games next season. The message that both instances send is that rules
are interpreted diﬀerently when it means protecting TV and bowl partners that
have become so lucrative for its member schools.
(Hunter, 2011)
It would seem that the NCAA’s stance around amateurism is hypocritical: while
they continue to impose these outdated and exploitative rules on their studentathletes, they themselves are unwilling to prioritize these rules when ratings and
proﬁts are at stake. To be clear, the argument here is not whether proﬁt should be
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the end goal, but rather for transparency around the revenue distribution model. If
proﬁt is indeed the end goal, then those creating the proﬁts undoubtedly deserve
to see, at minimum, a “teeny, tiny slice of it.”
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